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One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History of
the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and
Suggestions for Increased Participation and
Future Compliance
Stephan Michael Brown*
INTRODUCTION
According to the most recent estimate in 2006, the tax gap,
defined as “the amount of tax liability faced by taxpayers that is
not paid on time,”1 was $450 billion,2 with an estimated $100
billion resulting from unreported international income annually.3
Perhaps not coincidentally, in 2002, the foreign bank account
reporting (hereinafter “FBAR”) compliance rate was estimated to
be potentially less than 20%.4 In response, the government has
drastically increased the penalties for noncompliance,5 and the
Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter “IRS”) has introduced a
series of pseudo-amnesty programs.6 The recent Offshore
* JD, 2014, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law; BS Accounting,
2006, San Diego State University. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Professor
Robert K. Morrow for his time and effort spent in providing invaluable guidance and
direction throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank the members of the
Chapman Law Review for their time and commitment to the editing process. Finally, I
would like to thank my wife, Eva Brown, for her continued love and support throughout
law school, particularly while working on this paper.
1 Internal Revenue Serv., The Tax Gap, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-TaxGap (last updated Dec. 3, 2013).
2 See Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Gap “Map”, IRS.GOV., (Dec. 2011), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_map_2006.pdf.
3 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS , 110TH CONG., REP. ON
TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (Comm. Print 2008); see also Susan C.
Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L.
REV. 675, 701 n.92 (2012) (providing several estimates ranging from $50 billion to $255
billion annually).
4 See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH §361(b)
OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at 6 (2002), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/ReportToCongress361.PDF. A perfectly accurate
compliance rate would have been difficult to determine due to the limited amount of
available information. However, this approximation is based on the Service’s estimate
from the limited information it did have. Id.
5 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C) (2012).
6 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-5 (Jan. 14, 2003), available at www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-news/ir-03-05.pdf (announcing the 2003 Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative);
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Voluntary Disclosure (hereinafter “OVD”) programs have been
instrumental in increased compliance for FBAR and reporting of
worldwide income.7 Although the programs have been considered
successful,8 there are still a large number of taxpayers who
remain noncompliant with respect to reporting their foreign
income and assets.9
This Article will offer suggestions to improve the current
OVD program which will further the purposes of increased
compliance and revenue collection.10 Part I will provide a history
of FBAR, including the events leading to increased penalties for
noncompliance and the introduction of the first OVD program in
2003. Part II will establish the reemergence of the
pseudo-amnesty OVD programs in 2009 and 2011, as well as the
quiet disclosure and opt-out alternatives to voluntary disclosure.
Part III will evaluate the meaning of “willfulness” in the context
of FBAR penalties by detailing recent developments in case law,
and will discuss the resulting uncertainties in the context of the
OVD program. Part IV will explore the continuation of the OVD
program in its current state, including an analysis of problems
with the program.

Internal Revenue Serv., Statement from IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman on Offshore
Income, IRS.GOV (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Statement-from-IRS-Commiss
ioner-Doug-Shulman-on-Offshore-Income (announcing the 2009 Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Initiative); I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-84 (Aug. 8, 2011), available at http://
www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Reminds-Taxpayers-that-the-Aug.-31-Deadline-Is-Fast-Approaching
-for-the-Second-Special-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-of-Offshore-Accounts (announcing
the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program); I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9,
2012),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Offshore-Programs-Produce-$4.4Billion-To-Date-for-Nation’s-Taxpayers;-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Reopens
(announcing the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program).
7 See Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle
Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 526 (2012).
8 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012), available at http://www.
irs.gov/uac/IRS-Says-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-New-Details-on-the-Vol
untary-Disclosure-Program-and-Closing-of-Offshore-Loophole (quoting IRS Commissioner
Doug Shulman, who stated that the IRS “‘continue[d] to make strong progress in our
international compliance efforts that help ensure honest taxpayers are not footing the bill
for those hiding assets offshore’”).
9 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 134 (2012)
(“While an estimated five to seven million U.S. citizens reside abroad, and many more
U.S. residents have FBAR filing requirements, the IRS received only 741,249 FBAR
filings in 2011, and as of September 29, 2012, it had received fewer than 28,000 OVD
submissions from FBAR violators. Thus, significant FBAR filing compliance problems
likely remain unaddressed.”).
10 See Internal Revenue Serv., Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently
Asked Questions and Answers, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/InternationalTaxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Ans
wers (last updated Aug. 26, 2013) (stating that the objective of the program is “to bring
taxpayers that have used undisclosed foreign accounts and undisclosed foreign entities to
avoid or evade tax into compliance with United States tax laws”).

Do Not Delete

2014]

10/13/2014 5:31 PM

One Size Fits Small

245

This Article will conclude that in order to further increase
compliance, the OVD program should eliminate the
one-size-fits-all approach by expanding the current penalty
structure with the goal of drastically increasing participation.
The program should be given an end date, and it should coincide
with public prosecutions of the most egregious offenders. Doing
so will give taxpayers who have not yet come forward to disclose
their foreign accounts a great incentive to do so by reducing the
penalty for past actions. The result will be a huge boost to
current and future tax revenues. Alternatively, if the program is
not expanded, the majority of taxpayers who have not yet come
forward will likely continue to hide their assets offshore and the
international tax gap will continue to be astoundingly large,
putting a strain on compliant taxpayers.
I. HISTORY OF FOREIGN BANK ACCOUNT REPORTING AND
PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE
The FBAR requirement was initially established by the
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970,
commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act, part of which is
codified in Title 31 of the United States Code.11 The purpose of
the requirement was to obtain data with “a high degree of
usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or
proceedings.”12 In 2001, the Patriot Act13 expanded the purpose to
include protecting against international terrorism.14 The Patriot
Act amendment made the reporting requirements of Title 31
more of a priority, with one commentator noting, “Nowadays,
once something has been labeled as crucial to the ubiquitous ‘war
on terror,’ there seem to be few (if any) limits on governmental
efforts.”15
Section 5314(a) of the Patriot Act provides that
the Secretary of the Treasury shall require a resident or citizen of
the United States or a person in, and doing business in, the United
States, to keep records, file reports, or keep records and file reports,
when the resident, citizen, or person makes a transaction or
11 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314 (2012); see also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Bank
Secrecy Act, FINCEN.GOV, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2014).
12 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2000) (prior to 2004 amendment).
13 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012)).
14 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012) (adding “or in the conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to protect against international
terrorism”).
15 Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, and
Why It Matters, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 3 (2006).

Do Not Delete

246

10/13/2014 5:31 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:1

maintains a relation for any person with a foreign financial
agency. 16

The Code then states that the “records and reports shall
contain . . . information in the way and to the extent the
Secretary prescribes.”17 Under this authority, the Secretary of
the Treasury developed Form TD F 90-22.1 “Report of Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts,”18 commonly referred to as Foreign
Bank Account Reporting, or FBAR, which has recently been
replaced by FinCEN Form 114.19 The Form requires reporting of
the maximum value of all foreign accounts exceeding $10,000 at
any time during the calendar year.20
Prior to 2004, the Secretary of the Treasury could have
imposed a civil monetary penalty on any person “willfully
violat[ing]” the FBAR requirement.21 According to the Supreme
Court in Cheek v. United States, “[w]illfulness . . . require[d] the
Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the
defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he
voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.”22 Furthermore,
“carrying this burden require[d] negating a defendant’s claim of
ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a
misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he
was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws.”23
Although willfulness required such a high evidentiary standard,
if proven, the Secretary could have imposed monetary civil
penalties, ranging from $25,000 up to the balance in the account
at the time of the violation, whichever was greater, with a
maximum penalty of $100,000 for each violation.24 In addition to
the civil penalty provision, any person found willfully violating
31 U.S.C. § 5314(a).
Id.
U.S. DEP ’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM TD F 90-22.1, REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (2012) [hereinafter FORM TD F 90-22.1], available at www.fin
cen.gov/forms/files/f9022-1_fbar.pdf.
19 Internal Revenue Serv., 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program (last updated Jan.
24, 2014).
20 See FORM TD F 90-22.1, supra note 18, at 6; see also FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT
NETWORK, BSA ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (FINCEN FORM 114) 4 (2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/
forms/files/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instructions.pdf.
21 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A) (2000) (prior to 2004 amendment).
22 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
23 Id. at 202. Although this case was regarding the FBAR civil penalty under Title
31, the Court opted to use the term “tax laws.” Several courts and commentators use
terms such as “tax laws” and “taxpayers” when referring to the FBAR penalty. See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. McBride,
908 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Utah 2012); Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 10. Due to the
nature of the OVD programs, this Article will do the same.
24 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2000) (prior to 2004 amendment).
16
17
18
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the FBAR requirement could have been subject to a criminal
penalty of up to $250,000, or up to five years in prison, or both.25
Section 361(b) of the Patriot Act requires annual reports to
Congress as follows:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall study methods for improving
compliance with the reporting requirements established in section
5314 of title 31, United States Code, and shall submit a report on such
study to the Congress by the end of the 6-month period beginning on
the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 26, 2001] and each 1-year
period thereafter. The initial report shall include historical data on
compliance with such reporting requirements.26

The initial report, given in April 2002,27 estimated that FBAR
compliance was potentially below 20%.28 The report also
indicated that enforcement was virtually nonexistent.29 Some of
the reasons cited for the lack of enforcement included difficulty in
obtaining evidence of undisclosed foreign financial accounts,30 the
U.S. Department of Justice’s preference to charge taxpayers with
other violations (typically illegal conduct such as tax evasion,
fraud, or money laundering),31 and the difficulty prosecutors had
in demonstrating willfulness for civil penalties.32
The report gave recommendations for improving compliance
with FBAR reporting requirements, and provided the IRS and
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (hereinafter
“FinCEN”)33 with five objectives for the following year: update
and improve the FBAR form and instructions, review filing and
processing procedures, enhance outreach and education to tax
practitioners, establish a joint task force on prosecutions and
enforcement, and consider delegating penalty authority from
FinCEN to the IRS.34 Additionally, although the report

31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2012).
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 361(b), 115 Stat. 272, 332.
27 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4.
28 Id. at 6.
29 Id. at 8 (“Between 1996 and 1998, Justice Department statistics reveal that only
nine indictments were filed charging 31 U.S.C. 5314; in 1999 and 2000, no one appears to
have been charged. The Customs Service reports only three convictions since 1995.”); see
also id. at 9 (reporting only twelve referrals for civil enforcement since 1993, only two of
which were assessed monetary penalties).
30 Id. at 8.
31 Id. at 9.
32 Id. at 10.
33 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network was established in 1990 as a bureau
of the Department of the Treasury and was tasked with enforcing the FBAR provisions
under Chapter 53 of Title 31, among other things. See 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012).
34 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4, at 12–13.
25
26
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recognized that uninformed taxpayers35 would benefit from
education and outreach,36 it found that this would not increase
compliance for “taxpayers who fail to file because they are
concealing income or are engaged in some kind of criminal
activity.”37 For this group, the report suggested deterrence
through “a series of highly publicized criminal actions against
intentional violators in order to raise the cost of being an FBAR
scofflaw.”38
In April 2003, the second report was presented, the bulk of
which detailed the progress made on the objectives from the
initial report.39 In an agreement reached weeks before the second
report was issued, FinCEN delegated its authority to enforce
FBAR provisions to the IRS.40 The IRS also took over the
responsibility of updating and improving the FBAR form and
instructions; however, no such updates or improvements were
made and no new target date was given for this goal.41 The IRS
also assumed the responsibility of reviewing filing and processing
procedures of the FBAR forms,42 and began taking steps to
improve outreach and education such as utilizing media outlets
and working with tax practitioner organizations.43 Lastly, a joint
task force was formed between the IRS, FinCEN, and the
Department of Justice to enhance prosecutions and enforcement,
which included the IRS’s 2003 Offshore Voluntary Compliance
Initiative (hereinafter “OVCI”).44 The second report concluded
with goals for the following year: emphasize examination of
offshore activities, identify potential non-filers, continue outreach
and education, and use input from filers to improve the FBAR
form.45
The 2003 OVCI was the first program administered by the
IRS designed to allow taxpayers with “offshore financial
arrangements” to voluntarily come forward and “clear up their
35 Common scenarios in which taxpayers may be unwittingly subject to the FBAR
rules include students studying abroad, taxpayers with temporary offshore work
assignments, individuals with inherited foreign accounts, and immigrants. See Sheppard,
supra note 15, at 26–27.
36 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4, at 10–11.
37 Id. at 11.
38 Id.
39 See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH §361(b)
OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001, at 3 (2003), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/fbar3613.pdf.
40 Id. at 4–5.
41 Id. at 5.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 5–6.
44 Id. at 6–7.
45 Id. at 7–8.
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tax liabilities.”46 The program came on the heels of an Offshore
Credit Card Program that included credit card summonses in
2000 and 2002 meant to find offshore tax evaders.47 The purpose
was to quickly bring taxpayers back into compliance and to
simultaneously gather information about promoters of offshore
schemes.48 Essentially, the initiative was a pseudo-amnesty
program allowing taxpayers to voluntarily amend their tax
returns to include offshore income in exchange for a waiver of
certain penalties and a guarantee of no criminal prosecution.49
According to a July 2003 IRS News Release, the program brought
in $75 million in taxes, at a cost of approximately $2 million. 50
These results were not without controversy however, with one
report suggesting that only $3.3 million had been assessed at a
cost of an estimated $56 million.51 Although the success may
have been limited, the IRS did identify over 400 offshore
promoters, about half of which were previously unknown to the
IRS.52
In April 2005, a third report was presented,53 ingeniously
referred to as the third annual report.54 This report detailed the
progress made on the objectives from the prior two periods,
including reiterating and at times expanding on the second
report.55 One noteworthy point included in the third annual
report was a list of several problems identified with the current
FBAR form, leading to the uninspired conclusion that the IRS
would concentrate on the instructions, “leaving material revision
of the form itself to another day.”56 Also of note, the report
See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-5, supra note 6, at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-4 I.R.B. 311.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-95 (July 30, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-news/ir-03-95.pdf.
51 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 507. Such results lead one to question government
accounting methods. If a taxpayer’s calculations resulted in such a discrepancy, it would
be deemed fraudulent.
52 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-95, supra note 50.
53 SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH §361(b) OF
THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED
TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 (USA PATRIOT ACT) (2005) (listing
the year 2004 in the web address even though the report was presented in 2005). One
point of interest is the date is that not included on the cover page as in the prior two
reports, perhaps because the report came a year later than that mandated by law under
the Patriot Act. Furthermore, this is the last report to Congress despite the continuing
requirement for annual reports.
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id. at 5–11.
56 Id. at 6–8. The Form and Instructions were eventually updated in 2008. See Philip
T. Pasmanik & Neil A. J. Sullivan, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial
Accounts: Significant Revisions and Severe Penalties, J. ACCT. (July 2009),
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/TTAFBARReport.htm.
46
47
48
49
50
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showed a 17% increase in FBAR filings from 2000 to 2003,
believed to be in significant part from the 2003 OVCI.57
Overall, these reports convinced Congress that FBAR
compliance was unsatisfactory, and several bills were introduced
to address the problem.58 Eventually, on October 22, 2004, the
American Jobs Creation Act of 200459 was passed, part of which
gave section 5321 a major overhaul.
Following this overhaul, a revised section 5321(a)(5)(C)
increased the penalty for a person who willfully violates the
FBAR requirement to the greater of $100,000 or 50% of the
account balance, with no ceiling.60 As one commentator noted,
“Given the astronomical balance in some unreported accounts,
and the fact that the IRS often applies the penalty on a
per-account-per-year basis, the penalties can be enormous.”61
Under section 5321(a)(5)(A), the Secretary of the Treasury was
given discretion to impose a penalty of up to $10,000 for
non-willful violations,62 though an exception for “reasonable
cause” is provided if “the amount of the transaction or the
balance in the account at the time of the transaction was
properly reported.”63 The criminal penalties remain unchanged
following this overhaul.64
II. 2009 AND 2011 OVD PROGRAMS AND ALTERNATIVES
Six years passed before the successor to OVCI, the 2009
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (hereinafter “OVDP”),
was put in place.65 This program ran in conjunction with a

See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 53, at 11.
See Sheppard, supra note 15, at 17 n.101.
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C) (2012).
See Hale E. Sheppard, Third Time’s the Charm: Government Finally Collects
‘Willful’ FBAR Penalty in Williams, 117 J. TAX’N 319, 320 (2012); see also NAT ’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 147 (“Because the statute of limitations period is six years,
the maximum penalty for large accounts is essentially 300 percent of the maximum
account balances (assuming a relatively constant balance).”).
62 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A)–(B)(i). The IRS has taken the aggressive position that
the non-willful penalty can be applied on a per-account, per-year basis; however, this
issue has not yet been litigated. Internal Revenue Serv., Internal Revenue Manual
4.26.16.4, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, IRS.GOV (July 1, 2008),
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-026-016.html.
63 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii)(II).
64 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a).
65 See Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, Deputy IRS Comm’r for Servs. and
Enforcement, to Comm’r, Large and Mid-Size Bus. Div. and Comm’r, Small
Bus./Self-Employed Div. (Mar. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff],
available at http://hodgen.com/irs-amnesty-offshore-account/; see also Internal Revenue
Serv., supra note 6.
57
58
59
60
61
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crackdown on offshore tax evasion66—which focused on the
international banking giant UBS—that began when a
disgruntled employee revealed that “he was part of a UBS team
that made frequent trips across the Atlantic to aggressively
market investment strategies to rich Americans to elude the
scrutiny of the Internal Revenue Service.”67 In the summer of
2008, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a John Doe
Summons asking UBS to disclose the names of all of its U.S.
clients, representing “the first time that the United States ha[d]
attempted to pierce Swiss bank secrecy by compelling a Swiss
bank to name its U.S. clients.”68 This led to an agreement by UBS
to pay a $780 million penalty and release the names of 250
Americans.69
The Department of Justice was not satisfied, however, and in
February 2009 “filed another civil lawsuit against UBS seeking
the identities of 52,000 more Americans suspected of stashing a
total of $15 billion at the bank.”70 Following an agreement
between the United States and Swiss governments, a settlement
was reached in the case, with UBS agreeing to supply the names
of close to 4450 American account holders the IRS suspected of
evading taxes.71 Specific details of the agreement were not
released until after the completion of the 2009 OVDP, which
brought in more than 15,000 taxpayers, many more than the
1000 taxpayers the IRS expected would participate.72
The 2009 OVDP required taxpayers to amend or file six
years of tax returns and FBARs, and pay any resulting increase
in tax with interest.73 Taxpayers were assessed either an
accuracy or delinquency penalty for all six years, with no
possibility for a reasonable cause exception.74 Additionally, in
lieu of all other penalties, including the statutory FBAR
66 The timing of the 2009 program was intended to capitalize on the publicity of the
scandal. See Lederman, supra note 7, at 510 (“The 2009 initiative was timed to profit from
the publicity about Birkenfield and UBS . . . .”).
67 Graham Bowley, A Privileged World Begins to Give Up Its Secrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 23, 2009, at WK3.
68 Jared Seff, Cracking Down on Tax Evaders—Swiss Banking: Secrets, Lies, and
Deception, 38 S.U. L. REV . 159, 162 (2010).
69 Id. at 162–63.
70 Id. at 164.
71 Id. At 164–65. Although the results of the agreement have led to increased
disclosure by many Americans, some members of Congress were not appeased. As
Michigan Senator Carl Levin stated, “[T]he tortured wording and the many limitations in
this Annex shows the Swiss Government trying to preserve as much bank secrecy as it
can for the future, while pushing to conceal the names of tens of thousands of suspected
U.S. tax cheats. It is disappointing that the U.S. government went along.” Id. at 172.
72 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 510.
73 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 6.
74 See Memorandum from Linda E. Stiff, supra note 65, at 2.
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penalties, participants in the program had to pay a penalty equal
to 20% of the amount in foreign accounts in the year with the
highest aggregate balance during the six-year period.75 The IRS
warned that taxpayers who do not come forward through the
program could be subject to additional penalties, with agents
instructed to pursue “both civil and criminal avenues, and
consider all available penalties including the maximum penalty
for the willful failure to file the FBAR report and the fraud
penalty.”76 The IRS considered the program a resounding
success, boasting an estimated $3.4 billion of tax revenue.77
Although the IRS considered the 2009 OVDP as highly
effective, some taxpayers chose to go outside of the program and
make a “quiet disclosure”78 by simply amending their returns to
include any foreign income and paying the resulting tax. A quiet
disclosure was seen by taxpayers as a safe substitute to get
around the severe penalties imposed through the OVDP.79 The
IRS, on the other hand, saw it as undermining the credibility of a
program that was otherwise proving a success.80 The government
discouraged the practice, therefore, by reminding those opting to
make a quiet disclosure that they were risking criminal
prosecution, relief from which was only possible by open
participation in the program.81 Despite this, there has not been a
widely publicized case of significant penalties being assessed
after a quiet disclosure. Therefore, the public’s perception may be
that circumventing the program to avoid penalties is a viable
option.82
75 Id. There was a narrow exception to reduce the penalty to 5% if the taxpayer did
not open the foreign accounts, there was no activity in the accounts, and all U.S. taxes
had been paid on the funds in the accounts, with only account earnings escaping taxation.
Id.
76 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 6.
77 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 6. Following the program, the IRS
combed through the data received and continued to prosecute UBS clients. See Lederman,
supra note 7, at 511. As another strategy to curb offshore tax evasion, in 2010 Congress
enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) as part of the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, requiring additional foreign asset
reporting on U.S. tax returns while creating some overlap with existing FBAR
requirements. Id. at 512. FATCA also imposes information-sharing obligations on foreign
banks, incentivized by a 30% withholding on United States-sourced payments against
institutions that do not comply. Id.
78 See Internal Revenue Serv., Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers,
IRS.GOV, Q&A 10 (May 6, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Voluntary-Disclosure:-Questionsand-Answers.
79 See Morse, supra note 3, at 720–21.
80 Id. at 721.
81 Id. at 722.
82 Id. The closest the government has come to such a prosecution occurred in August
of 2011, after a taxpayer made a quiet disclosure by amending his returns and submitting
FBARs. Although he was in compliance in those regards, he left off significant income
from a partnership on both the original returns and the amended ones. See Jeremy
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Following the success of the 2009 OVDP, on February 8,
2011, the 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (2011
OVDI) was introduced.83 The program was similar to the 2009
OVDP, with three key differences: the look-back period was
extended to eight years,84 the penalty imposed on the highest
aggregate offshore account balances was increased from 20% to
25%—although some taxpayers may qualify for a reduced
penalty of 5% or 12.5% in certain narrow circumstances85—and,
to help combat quiet disclosures, the program provided
participants with an option to opt out of the penalty.86
Opting out of the civil settlement structure alternative
allows taxpayers who do not agree with the flat penalty under
the program to opt out of the penalty.87 However, taxpayers
choosing to opt out are subjected to a complete examination.88
The examiner will determine whether willfulness exists, and no
penalty will be assessed if the IRS deems that the failure to file
was due to reasonable cause.89 While participation in the
program comes with a recommendation not to prosecute for
violations up to the date of the disclosure,90 participants who opt
out “could be referred to Criminal Investigation for investigation
and possible prosecution and assertion of the civil fraud
penalty.”91 Without any type of assurances, it is not a surprise
Pelofsky, Bank Executive to Plead Guilty to Hiding Account, REUTERS, May 19, 2011,
available at https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I2ed6a540956511e19fefb85885c303b5/
View/FullText.html. The question remains whether the government will prosecute a
taxpayer making a quiet disclosure that is complete and accurate. See Remy Farag, HSBC
Client Prosecuted After Quiet Disclosure, J. INT’L TAX’N, Aug. 2011, at 8, 9. The IRS says
they will be on the lookout for taxpayers making quiet disclosures and look to penalize
and perhaps prosecute. See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 10, at FAQ 15–16. The
reality of that threat remains questionable. See Randall P. Andreozzi & Arlene M.
Hibschweiler, FBAR: Handle With Care, 43 TAX ADVISER 330, 335 (2012) (“Since Schiavo
involves an incomplete quiet disclosure, whether the IRS will treat complete and accurate
quiet disclosures similarly remains unclear.”).
83 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-84, supra note 6.
84 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 515. The look-back period was extended so OVD
participants “did not get a ‘pass’ with respect to the 2003 and 2004 tax years.” Id.
85 Id. at 516. The circumstances necessary for the 5% penalty were similar to the
requirements under the 2009 OVDP, see supra note 75, except that instead of no account
activity being allowed, there must have been less than $1000 withdrawn per year. See
Internal Revenue Serv., 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked
Questions, IRS.GOV, FAQ 52, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/
2011-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers
(last updated Jan. 24, 2014). In order to qualify for the 12.5% penalty, the highest
aggregate balance during the look-back period must have been less than $75,000. Id. at
FAQ 53.
86 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 516.
87 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 85, at FAQ 51.
88 Id.
89 Id. at FAQ 51.1.
90 Id. at FAQ 51.3.
91 Id.
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that less than 1% of program participants have opted out since it
has become an option.92 As a recent report by the National
Taxpayer Advocate noted,
even where taxpayers feel strongly that their FBAR noncompliance
was due to reasonable cause or was not willful, faced with the choice
of accepting the IRS’s proposed penalty . . . or opting for a full
examination — with the hope of avoiding the penalty . . . of far more
than their net worth . . . — many will not want to risk opting out. 93

The IRS reported that it had received a total of 33,000
voluntary disclosures under the 2009 and 2011 programs
combined, and collected $4.4 billion.94 However, at the time of
these two OVD programs, taxpayers and tax practitioners alike
were just becoming aware of the FBAR requirements, so many of
the OVD participants would not have been subject to the civil
penalty for willfulness for the tax years at issue.95 Even so, the
IRS opted to impose a penalty that is an excellent deal for willful
violators, but a terrible option for non-willful violators.96
Unfortunately, many taxpayers entering the program succumbed
to the fear tactics of the IRS and agreed to pay a penalty through
the OVD program that is greater than the penalty that would
have otherwise been assessed, if any.97
III. WILLFULNESS: THE WILLIAMS TRILOGY AND THE CURRENT
STATE OF UNCERTAINTY
As discussed in Part II above, under the old law, imposing
the FBAR penalty required a high evidentiary standard due to
the willfulness requirement.98 This resulted in a serious lack of
prosecutions under the old regime.99 More recently, however, a
trilogy of cases culminating in the Fourth Circuit as United
States v. Williams100 has left tax practitioners with considerable

92 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 138 (depicting 30 out of 11,941
participants electing to opt out of the 2011 program, with only 8 of those cases closed as of
September 29, 2012, one year after the close of the 2011 program).
93 Id. at 149.
94 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 6.
95 See Morse, supra note 3, at 715 (“It is conceivable, given the historic lack of
publicity about, and enforcement of, the FBAR filing requirements, that a defendant
might be able to show a lack of willfulness.”).
96 See id. at 714 (“[The government] used twenty percent . . . and twenty-five
percent . . . as the price for entering the voluntary disclosure program. This represents a
discount from the statutory civil willfulness penalty of fifty percent of the account balance
for each annual failure to file.”).
97 See id. at 715–16.
98 See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
99 See SEC’Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4.
100 See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 319 (“The Williams trilogy has been a long road,
with stops in the U.S. Tax Court (131 TC 54 (2008); ‘Williams I’), the U.S. district court
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uncertainty as to what is required to establish willfulness with
respect to FBAR violations.101 In these cases, the taxpayer was
an attorney who, after graduating from NYU, worked in the
corporate finance department of a major international law
firm.102 He then obtained employment at Mobil Oil Corporation,
where he worked in various legal and business positions,
including, in 1991, exploring business opportunities for Mobil in
the newly opened Russian markets.103 Two years later, he created
a British Virgin Islands corporation, ALQI Holdings, Ltd., and
opened up two bank accounts in the corporation’s name for
holding the funds he received from foreign sources.104 From 1993
to 2000, Williams deposited more than $7 million into these
accounts, which generated more than $800,000 of interest and
investment income.105 With respect to these foreign accounts,
Williams had three duties: report the foreign income on his tax
returns, check “yes” on Schedule B of his tax return to indicate
that he has one or more foreign accounts,106 and file an FBAR.107
He violated all three of these duties.108
Beginning in 2000, Williams came under scrutiny by the
IRS, which eventually led to guilty pleas in 2003 on one count of
criminal tax evasion and one count of criminal conspiracy to
defraud the government.109 At his sentencing in September 2003,
the court imposed a punishment of forty-six months in jail, a
$25,000 fine, restitution of over $3.5 million, and three years of
supervised release.110
Williams’s troubles were not over yet, as the IRS initiated a
civil examination of his finances following the criminal

(106 AFTR2d 2010-6150 (2010); ‘Williams II’), and, most recently, the Fourth Circuit in
Williams III.”).
101 See id. (“[Williams III], already the subject of much criticism by the tax
community, raises more questions than answers.”).
102 See id. at 320.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 U.S. DEP’ T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1040, SCHEDULE B—INTEREST AND ORDINARY
DIVIDENDS (2000), available at http://www.irs. gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040sab--2000.pdf. Line
7a asks: “At any time during 2000, did you have an interest in or a signature or other
authority over a financial account in a foreign country, such as a bank account, securities
account, or other financial account?” Id. It then instructs the taxpayer to “[s]ee page B-2
for exceptions and filing requirements for Form TD F 90-22.1.” Id. The government
argues that this instruction is enough to establish knowledge of the FBAR requirement.
See United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-cv-437, 2010 WL 3473311, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1,
2010).
107 See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 320.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 321.
110 Id. at 322.
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sentencing.111 In January 2007, the revenue agent asked him to
file an FBAR for 2000, which Williams later claimed was the first
time he had heard of the requirement.112 Thereafter, the IRS
issued a notice of deficiency, assessing significant increases to
Williams’s income tax liabilities for the tax years 1993 through
2000, as well as penalties for negligence and civil fraud.113
Additionally, the revenue agent assessed a civil FBAR penalty for
2000,114 charging Williams the then-maximum penalty of
$100,000 for each account.115
Following these assessments, Williams petitioned the Tax
Court, contesting all of the proposed deficiencies as well as the
FBAR penalties.116 The Tax Court determined that it only has
authority to review determinations of taxes imposed by Title 26,
concluding that “the [FBAR] penalty . . . falls outside our
jurisdiction to review deficiency determinations.”117
Williams never paid the FBAR penalty, so in April 2009 the
government filed a complaint in district court in order to
collect.118 Due to Williams’s checking “No” on Schedule B in
response to having any foreign bank accounts, the government
argued that his “signature on his Form 1040 is prima facie

Id.
Id.
Id. Generally, the statute of limitations for income tax and related penalties is
three years from the later of the date of filing or the due date of the return .
I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2012). However, there is no statute of limitations for fraudulent or
unfiled returns. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1)–(3).
114 Sheppard, supra note 61, at 322. The FBAR penalties have a six-year statute of
limitations. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012). Therefore, the only year subject to this penalty
was 2000. Sheppard, supra note 61, at 322.
115 See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 322.
116 Id.
117 Williams v. Comm’r, 131 T.C. 54, 58 (2008). The Tax Court also concluded that it
lacks jurisdiction to address any FBAR penalty collection issue. Id. at 59. The Bankruptcy
Court also lacks jurisdiction over FBAR penalty assessments. United States v. Simonelli,
614 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246–47 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding that the FBAR penalty is not a tax
penalty and is consequently barred from discharge). 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2012) provides
an avenue in district court for
[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any
internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or
any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected
under the internal-revenue laws.
Based on this statute, if the penalty is assessed, it cannot be litigated unless it is paid.
Thus, it appears that no avenue exists to litigate assessment of a civil FBAR penalty
without paying it, except to wait for the government to bring a collection suit as in
Williams II.
118 United States v. Williams, No. 1:09-cv-437, 2010 WL 3473311, at *1–2 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 1, 2010). The suit was brought pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2), allowing the
government to commence a civil action to recover an FBAR penalty within two years of
assessment. Id. at *1.
111
112
113
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evidence that Williams knew the contents of his tax return.”119
The court was not persuaded, emphasizing that “these actions
occurred after Williams found out that the U.S. and Swiss
authorities knew about the ALQI accounts.”120 Considering these
facts, the Court determined that “it clearly follows logically that
Williams was aware that the authorities knew about the ALQI
accounts by the fall of 2000, significantly before June 30,
2001 . . . . [This] strongly indicate[s] . . . that Williams lacked any
motivation to willfully conceal the accounts from authorities after
that point.”121 The court concluded that “Williams’ failure to
disclose already-frozen assets in a foreign account was not an act
undertaken intentionally or in deliberate disregard for the law,
but instead constituted an understandable omission given the
context in which it occurred.”122 The holding strongly suggested
that “the IRS would have a hard time proving willfulness when a
taxpayer didn’t know about FBARs. [It also] may have caused
some with foreign accounts not to step forward.”123
Unsurprisingly, the government was dissatisfied with this
holding, and filed an appeal in November 2010.124 Beginning with
precedent in criminal matters before transitioning to a broader
definition for civil violations, the court in Williams III gave the
following overview in an attempt to define willfulness in the
FBAR context:
“Willfulness may be proven through inference from conduct meant to
conceal or mislead sources of income or other financial information,”
and it “can be inferred from a conscious effort to avoid learning about
reporting requirements.” United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466,
1476 (6th Cir.1991) (internal citations omitted) (noting willfulness
standard in criminal conviction for failure to file an FBAR). Similarly,
“willful blindness” may be inferred where “a defendant was
subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of a tax
liability, and purposefully avoided learning the facts point to such
liability.” United States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 122 (4th Cir.2011)
(affirming criminal conviction for willful tax fraud where tax preparer
‘closed his eyes to’ large accounting discrepancies). Importantly, in
cases “where willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability,
[courts] have generally taken it to cover not only knowing violations of
a standard, but reckless ones as well.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.
Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007)

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Robert W. Wood, FBAR Penalties Just Got Even Worse, FORBES (July 22, 2012,
11:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/07/22/fbar-penalties-just-got-eve
n-worse/.
124 United States v. Williams, 489 F. App’x 655 (4th Cir. 2012).
119
120
121
122
123
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(emphasis added). Whether a person has willfully failed to comply
with a tax reporting requirement is a question of fact. Rykoff v. United
States, 40 F.3d 305, 307 (9th Cir.1994) . . . .125

Shortly thereafter, the court stated that “the evidence as a
whole leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the
district court clearly erred in finding that Williams did not
willfully violate § 5314.”126 The court found that Williams’s
signature is prima facie evidence that he knew what he was
signing, and “at a minimum line 7a’s directions to ‘[s]ee
instructions for exceptions and filing requirements for Form TD
F 90-22.1’ put Williams on inquiry notice of the FBAR
requirement.”127 The court determined that Williams’s lack of
attention to the contents of his tax return “constitute[d] willful
blindness to the FBAR requirement.”128 The court was further
convinced that Williams’s acknowledgement “that he willfully
failed to report the existence of the ALQI accounts to the IRS or
Department of the Treasury as part of his larger scheme of tax
evasion. [This] . . . [wa]s an admission of violating § 5314 . . . .”129
The court concluded that “at a minimum, Williams’s undisputed
actions establish reckless conduct, which satisfies the proof
requirement under § 5314 . . . [and] that the district court clearly
erred in finding that willfulness had not been established.”130
The dissent argued that “a reasonable factfinder [may]
conclude that the violation was willful, as the majority believes.
But there is also evidence supporting the opposite view.”131
In December 2012, a Utah district court affirmed the
precedent set in Williams III, finding that “[f]or an individual to
act ‘willfully,’ an individual need not have been subjectively
aware of the FBAR reporting requirement or else an individual
would be able to defeat liability by deliberately avoiding learning
of his or her legal duties.”132
Interestingly, the Court in Williams III applied a
significantly lower legal standard than the IRS published in its

Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id. at 661 (Agee, J., dissenting).
United States v. McBride, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1210 (D. Utah 2012).
Additionally, the District Court cited the overturned decision from Williams II (noting
that the decision was overturned on other grounds), stating that “in a civil FBAR penalty
case, . . . the United States’ burden of proof was ‘the preponderance of the evidence’ on all
questions before the court, including the question of whether the taxpayer’s failure to
report in that case was ‘willful.’” Id. at 1201.
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
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Internal Revenue Manual (hereinafter “IRM”), which requires
“the person’s knowledge of the [FBAR] reporting requirements
and the person’s conscious choice not to comply.”133 Although the
IRM suggests that willful blindness might rise to the level of
willfulness, the IRS states that “[t]he mere fact that a person
checked the wrong box, or no box, on a Schedule B is not
sufficient, by itself, to establish that the FBAR violation was
attributable to willful blindness.”134
In addition to this conflicting standard, it has been noted
that “[g]auging the impact of Williams III on opt out decisions
will be interesting, yet difficult to quantify . . . . The taxpayer’s
success in Williams II, followed by the taxpayer’s defeat in
Williams III, will trigger additional uncertainty for
taxpayers . . . .”135 Logic dictates that the same uncertainty will
apply in the context of quiet disclosures.
The initial success in Williams II was a victory for taxpayers,
likely encouraging many to avoid the high penalties in the OVD
programs altogether, and instead take their chances with an
opt-out or a quiet disclosure. Even though the decision was
overturned in Williams III, the taxpayer clearly intended to hide
his assets offshore, and many taxpayers realize that they are
unlikely to face an FBAR penalty of any kind if their failure to
report is less egregious. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of
taxpayers with foreign accounts still have not come forward
through the OVD programs.136
IV. 2012 OVDP LEAVES ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
Due to the success of the prior programs, the IRS announced
the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (hereinafter
“2012 OVDP”).137 Like the 2011 OVDI, the look-back period is
eight years, however the penalty on the maximum aggregate of
foreign account balances has been increased to 27.5%, and the
program is indefinite.138 The IRS makes clear that the program is

Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 62.
Id.
See Sheppard, supra note 61, at 332.
See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 142 (suggesting less than 1%
have entered the OVD programs).
137 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5, supra note 6.
138 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64, supra note 8; Lederman, supra note 7, at 517
(suggesting a risky proposition that the open-ended nature of the 2012 OVDP allows
taxpayers to strategize with regard to the timing of the voluntary disclosure if the earliest
year in the look-back period would create a larger amount of tax and penalty than the
current year).
133
134
135
136
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subject to change at any time, including a potential increase in
penalties or an end to the program altogether.139
Although the OVD Programs have been widely regarded as
effective, there is a perception of unfairness as a result of the
severe across-the-board penalty for failing to report foreign bank
accounts, regardless of the circumstances.140 Alternatives such as
opting out or making a quiet disclosure may be the best choice for
some taxpayers, but the uncertainty surrounding both options, in
addition to threats imposed by the IRS for utilizing these
alternatives,141 has forced many to accept the draconian penalties
imposed by the OVD programs.142
Although “[t]axpayers may normally correct their own
inadvertent violations without significant penalties or burdens,”
the IRS’s threats against quiet disclosures and the opt-out
alternatives discourage self-correction.143 Rather than face the
extreme penalties offered through the program, or risk being
caught making a quiet disclosure, “some taxpayers are likely to
ignore their problems until the IRS offers them a reasonable way
to correct inadvertent errors.”144 Collectively, these problems
have contributed to many taxpayers paying too much under the

See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 82, at FAQ 1.
See Kevin E. Packman, Noncompliance After the IRS Offshore Income Reporting
Iniative—What Options Remain?, 111 J. TAX’N 281, 283 (2009) (“The Initiative effectively
eliminated the reasonable cause exception for failure to file the FBAR and assumed that
all such failures were attributable to the taxpayer’s willfulness.”).
141 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 137 (“Because of these threats,
many taxpayers were concerned that the IRS would always seek the maximum FBAR
penalties, regardless of the situation.”); see also Gregory J. Bertsch & Benjamin C.
Hughes, Final FBAR Regulations: Navigating the Complex Requirements of Reporting
Foreign Bank Accounts, 25 J. TAX’N & REG. FIN. INSTITUTIONS 23, 31 (2011) (“IRS
examiners are given discretion to mitigate penalties and assess less than the maximum
amount; however, the recent trend has been for the IRS to pursue willful penalties and
assess the maximum amount permitted.”).
142 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 137 (finding “some benign actors
were so fearful . . . that they accepted the IRS settlement and paid more than they owed”).
143 Id. at 135–36 (“[T]hose who failed to report income could normally avoid
accuracy-related penalties by filing ‘qualified amended returns’ before being contacted by
the IRS. Thus, in the absence of any special IRS program, a taxpayer could correct a
failure to report a foreign account and income from the account while avoiding most
penalties by simply filing three (or six) years worth of returns (or amended returns) and
FBARs. This approach encourages voluntary compliance and self-correction, which is the
IRS’s stated goal.”).
144 Id. at 137. An important aspect in assessing the FBAR penalty outside of the OVD
programs is the fact that taxpayers and practitioners alike were unaware of the reporting
requirements. However, due to the recent crackdown, the resulting increased awareness
will raise the likelihood of the existence of willfulness. See Michael Sardar, What
Constitutes ‘Willfulness’ for Purposes of the FBAR Failure-to-File Penalty?, 113 J. TAX’N
183, 187 (2010).
139
140
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current one-size-fits-all structure, and the majority of taxpayers
choosing to remain noncompliant.145
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASED OVD PARTICIPATION AND
FUTURE COMPLIANCE
Overall, the recent OVD programs have been effective, but
there is a lot of room for improvement, as most taxpayers remain
non-compliant.146 The purpose of any amnesty program should be
to increase compliance over the long term.147 The few billions
that have been collected is paltry compared to the purported
$100 billion annual tax gap resulting from offshore income.148
Rather than leaving taxpayers with a choice between paying too
much or remaining noncompliant, the OVD program should be
greatly expanded to make participation an easy decision, which
will substantially increase voluntary compliance in the future,
thereby reducing the annual tax gap significantly.149
The OVD program should utilize a tiered-penalty structure
based on the amount of tax owed and the existence of mitigating
factors, instead of the one-size-fits-all approach currently being
used.150 Currently, the 2012 OVDP offers options for reduced
penalties of 5% and 12.5%.151 In addition to an opt-out option,152
however, the reduced penalties are too narrow for most taxpayers
entering the program to utilize, and opting out is generally an
unappealing option as previously discussed in Part II above.153
145 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 147 n.61 (“[T]he IRS’s current
approach may be more likely to reduce voluntary compliance and increase tax evasion.”).
146 See id. at 142 (“While the OVD programs attracted over 27,000 applications
(perhaps less than one percent of those who did not file FBARs) and collected almost
$5.5 billion, a more effective initiative could prompt significantly more taxpayers to come
into compliance voluntarily.”).
147 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 520 (“[R]evenue-raising should not be the primary
purpose of an amnesty . . . . Instead, bringing taxpayers into compliance should be.”).
148 See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON
TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (Comm. Print 2008). Based on the 2006
estimate, the international tax gap since 2003 is approximately $1 trillion.
149 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 153. The program should be
timed so that simultaneously, the forced compliance elements of FATCA will begin,
increasing the incentive for taxpayers to comply while it is still voluntary, and reducing
the risk of wasting IRS resources.
150 The National Taxpayer Advocate has suggested a similar approach with three
tiers. The first tier would provide an avenue to avoid all penalties, including civil
penalties on the additional income, if the amount due on the amended returns is less than
the greater of $5000 or 10% of the total tax. The second tier would eliminate the penalty
on the highest account balance for taxpayers who can show reasonable cause or who acted
non-willfully. The third tier would allow for anyone else who voluntarily comes forward to
participate in the program under the current penalty structure. See id. at 150–51.
151 See Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 10, at FAQ 52–53.
152 Id. at FAQ 51.
153 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 232 (2013).
The opt-out option is unappealing for many due to the risks associated with an audit as
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Historically speaking, only a small percentage of taxpayers who
failed to report offshore accounts will ever be assessed with the
willful penalty, which is generally the only penalty that is higher
than the penalty assessed through the program. Therefore, the
IRS should expand all three of these already existing options to
fit the circumstances of the majority of program participants.154
The IRS may be experimenting with the idea of providing
avenues for a reduced penalty with the addition of the
Streamlined Compliance Program, which occurs outside of the
OVD program, providing penalty relief for taxpayers who were
residing outside of the United States, did not file a tax return,
and had a tax liability below $1500 per year.155 This is an
excellent approach by the IRS as it signifies their realization that
one size does not fit all; however, much like the other
alternatives available, it is far too narrow.156 The alternative
penalty structures should be capable of being utilized just as
much as, if not more than, the highest penalty applicable under
the OVD program.
In the spirit of fairness, taxpayers who have previously
participated in an OVD program should be given an opportunity
to establish cause for a lower penalty based on the new
parameters and obtain any resulting refund without the
possibility of higher penalties being imposed.157 In order to
maximize credibility and increase awareness, the program
should be given an end date,158 and the IRS should carry out on

well as significantly slower processing times. Id. Unfortunately, to date, the “inflexible
opt-in-opt-out approach offered bad actors a relatively better deal and also provided them
with better customer service than benign actors.” Id. at 233.
154 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 153. When compared to the
penalty assessed under the program, “[t]he existing FBAR statute offers . . . taxpayers a
better deal, capping the maximum penalty at $10,000 per violation if the IRS cannot
prove the violation was willful and eliminating the penalty altogether if the taxpayer can
show ‘reasonable cause’ for his or her failure to report the account(s).” Id. at 148.
155 See Internal Revenue Serv., Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the
Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures for Non-Resident, Non-Filer Taxpayers,
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/FAQReStreamlinedFilin
gComplianceProceduresNRNFTPs (last updated Dec. 10, 2013). The $1500 threshold is
not a requirement, but rather a guideline, as the IRS generally will not consider
taxpayers with tax below this amount a risk factor. Id.
156 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 153, at 231 (“A new ‘streamlined’
program is less burdensome, but is overly narrow and does not provide certainty.”).
157 The IRS may balk at returning money it previously received under the OVD
penalty structure; however, if the tiered approach is successful at increasing future
compliance, any refunds given will be insignificant in relation to the reduction in the
annual tax gap.
158 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 518, 524 (suggesting that the ongoing nature of
the 2012 OVDP undermines its credibility and effectiveness).
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their threats against quiet disclosures159 and publicly prosecute
the most egregious examples of willful behavior.
Currently, IRS resources are tied up processing voluntary
disclosures of taxpayers who willingly came forward, leaving few
resources to pursue willful evaders.160 Expanding the program as
suggested will significantly increase voluntary compliance and
will free up valuable IRS resources to pursue taxpayers who are
purposefully evading taxes through the use of offshore
accounts.161 This group of tax evaders makes up a significantly
large portion of lost revenues annually, and should be the
intended target of IRS enforcement.162

159 See Morse, supra note 3, at 721 (determining that the lack of public prosecutions
of serious tax offenders who have made quiet disclosures undermines the IRS’s warnings
against them). It is clear when comparing the 2003 OVCI to the 2009 OVDP, that the
concurrent highly-publicized UBS scandal was extremely effective in increased
participation in the program. However, it appears unlikely that the IRS has the resources
to carry out their threat. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 9, at 135 (noting
concern that the IRS has “[i]ncreased the cost and burden of correcting past violations, as
well as the IRS resources required to process these corrections . . . .”).
160 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 153, at 233.
161 See Gerard Ryle et al., Secret Files Expose Offshore’s Global Impact, in SECRECY
FOR SALE: INSIDE THE GLOBAL OFFSHORE MONEY MAZE 4, 5 (2013), available at
http://cloudfront-files-1.publicintegrity.org/documents/pdfs/ICIJ%20Secrecy%20for%20Sal
e.pdf (“[O]ffshore financial secrecy has spread aggressively around the globe, allowing the
wealthy and the well-connected to dodge taxes . . . .”).
162 See Lederman, supra note 7, at 527 (citing Marie Sapirie, New Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Initiative Features 25 Percent Penalty, Greater Clarity, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb.
9, 2011, at 27-1) (quoting Gregory S. Lynam: “‘While it is great that the IRS is stepping up
use of all of its enforcement tools, there is a danger that the IRS may focus on the little
fish that voluntarily swim into the net.’”).
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Addendum
September 10, 2014
On June 18, 2014, the IRS announced a modification of
terms to the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program.163 The
modification includes an expansion to the Streamlined
Compliance Program to include taxpayers living in the United
States, taking effect July 1, 2014. Under this modification,
taxpayers that did not act willfully may qualify for a reduced
OVD penalty of 5%, and only have to amend three years of tax
returns.164 In order to qualify, the taxpayer must certify that the
failure to report all income, pay all tax, and/or submit all
required information returns, including FBARs, was not
willful.165
This is a significant change to the government’s previous
hardline approach, and it is completely in line with the
suggestions proposed in this Article. It appears that this new and
improved approach may be around for quite some time, which is
apparently necessary as compliance slowly begins to improve.
One major flaw with this new approach is the
unwillingness of the government to allow taxpayers who
previously entered the program to seek reimbursement under the
new parameters.166 Although the government has an efficiency
interest in abstaining from reviewing previously resolved cases,
this will likely result in an understandable perception of
unfairness towards those who came forward immediately to be
compliant. This is an unfortunate result, as the taxpayers who
previously entered the OVD programs were the first to come
forward, and were the most anxious to be in full compliance with
the government. Arguably, a majority of this group is most
deserving of paying smaller penalties.
In spite of this unfortunate flaw, this new modification is
an excellent approach to tackling the problems addressed in this

163 See Internal Revenue Serv., 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program,
IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/2012-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program
(last
updated June 18, 2014).
164 See Internal Revenue Serv., Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures, IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Streamlined-Filing-ComplianceProcedures (last updated Aug. 19, 2014).
165 Id.
166 See Internal Revenue Serv., Transition Rules: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs),
IRS.GOV, FAQ 2, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/TransitionRules-Frequently-Asked-Questions-FAQs (last updated June 18, 2014) (stating that a
taxpayer who has already completed an OVD program “will not be eligible”).
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Article, and should go a long way towards closing the significant
tax gap resulting from noncompliance in this area.
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